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The return of the EU Withdrawal Bill to the Commons this week raised 
an important question regarding the 15 amendments voted through 
during the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords. This was 
particularly important in respect of one amendment regarding the 
ability of Parliament to reject the ‘no deal’ scenario, and require the 
Government to return to the EU to further negotiate in the event of a 
deal that Parliament did not approve of. This has probably been the 
most publicised of the amendments put forward by the Lords, as the 
report[1] discusses the right of Parliament to vote to remain in the EU 
alongside the options of accepting the deal negotiated with the EU, or 
leaving the EU with no terms agreed. 
Aside from the political arguments that this amendment and the vote 
in the Commons on Tuesday have raised, the issue of the ‘meaningful 
vote’ raises important questions for the role of Parliament and 
Government in the process of negotiation and agreement of a 
withdrawal agreement and trade agreement with the EU. The 
Government’s argument is that this amendment ‘binds the hands’ of 
the Government’s negotiators as the EU’s negotiators know that any 
deal has to be approved by Parliament, and in the event of it being 
considered a ‘bad deal’ that the possibility of remaining in the EU 
would therefore be an alternative option available to Parliament. This, 
it is argued, would incentivise the EU to delay the negotiating 
progress until time had run out as this would result in a choice 
between ‘remain’ and ‘no deal’. 
The counter-argument is that to allow the Government to conclude a 
deal that Parliament is unable to reject on any other terms than ‘take it 
or leave it’ would effectively make the Parliamentary vote a Hobson’s 
Choice in a situation where the Government’s own 
assessment[2] makes no deal look more economically damaging than 
any of the possible deal scenarios considered in the report, and 
therefore on an economic analysis, Parliament would be more likely to 
approve the deal if ‘no deal’ is the only alternative. 
This goes to the heart of the UK’s ‘constitutional arrangements’ (a 
phrase brought to prominence by the wording of Article 50 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Miller case) 
as it raises questions of who is accountable to who, and who has the 
final decision on this matter. The Government has pointed out that it is 
the role of Government and not Parliament to negotiate international 
treaties. However, the Government is accountable to Parliament for its 
actions, (a fact that is less of an issue when the Government has a 
majority in the Commons but more of one with a minority Government 
with 2 rebellious factions and a Confidence and Supply agreement 
with the DUP) and that accountability needs to be meaningful. Indeed, 
Parliament has exercised meaningful oversight over previous 
European treaty changes (notably the Maastricht Treaty). In his 
resignation letter on Tuesday, Dr. Phillip Lee raised the point about 
his responsibility towards protecting the interests of his constituents, 
even though his constituency had a majority ‘leave’ vote in the EU 
referendum. As the Withdrawal Bill progresses, it therefore raises 
questions about what ‘taking back control’ means as stated in the 
referendum campaign, and where the accountability for that control 
lies. 
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